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n June 21, 2009, twelve former Division I student-athletes filed 
an antitrust complaint against the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (“NCAA”) alleging that the NCAA rules that prevent 
student-athletes from controlling the commercial rights to their names 
and likenesses violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 In response, the 
 
1 See Class Action Complaint Demand for Jury Trial, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. CV 09 
3329, 2009 WL 2416720 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2009) [hereinafter O’Bannon Complaint]. 
Since this complaint was filed, plaintiffs have revised their complaint on numerous 
occasions, both adding and subtracting plaintiffs, and changing slightly their underlying 
O
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NCAA has argued that its restraints on student-athlete names and 
likenesses serve the necessary purpose of maintaining competitive 
balance in college sports.2 In addition, the NCAA has asserted that if 
its nationwide restraints are overturned, it would financially “destroy 
college sports for the vast majority of student-athletes.”3 
This Article analyzes the pertinent legal issues in the NCAA 
Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation and explains 
why a plaintiffs’ victory would not lead to the demise of college 
sports as the NCAA suggests. Part I of this Article provides a history 
of the college sports marketplace, including its historic governance 
structure and its transition of economic power from individual 
colleges to the NCAA. Part II discusses the NCAA Student-Athlete 
Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation in terms of its procedural 
history and core legal principles. Part III explains why a win for the 
plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litigation would not truly destroy competitive balance in college 
sports. Finally, Part IV explains why a win for the plaintiffs similarly 
would not destroy the financial viability of college sports. 
 
legal theories. NCAA’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment; Opposition to Antitrust Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion at 6, 
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. 09-CV-1967-CW, 
2013 WL 6818041 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2013) [hereinafter NCAA’s Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment Motion]. 
2 See NCAA’s Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 1, 
at *17–22 (explaining various reasons as to how the NCAA’s “amateurism” rules 
purportedly help to maintain competitive balance in college sports and thus keep college 
athletics viable); see also Order Denying Motions to Compel Production of Documents by 
Nonparties, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., Nos. 09-cv-
01967-CW (NC), 11-mc-80300 CW (NC), 12-mc-80020 CW (NC), 2012 WL 629225, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2012) (“In support of one of its affirmative defenses, the NCAA 
claims that the NCAA’s rules . . . promote amateurism and competitive balance between 
and among NCAA member institutions.”). 
3 See Lester Munson, Players Seek ‘Quick Look’ Win in Court, ESPN OUTSIDE THE 
LINES (Nov. 22, 2013, 7:35 PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10018003/lawyers 
-obannon-vs-ncaa-case-trying-same-tactic-defeated-ncaa-1984-case (quoting NCAA chief 
legal officer Donald Remy, who stated that the plaintiffs suing the NCAA in the O’Bannon 
case seek “to destroy college sports for the vast majority of student-athletes in order to pay 
a few”); see also Defendant NCAA’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Third 
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 3, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name 
& Likeness Licensing Litig., No. 09-cv-1967-CW, 2013 WL 5402510 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 
27, 2013) (purporting that the NCAA rules that preclude student-athlete compensation 
“‘allow its survival in the face of commercializing pressures’” (quoting McCormack v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344–45 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
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I 
THE COLLEGE SPORTS MARKETPLACE 
A. Brief Snapshot of the NCAA 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) is the 
“dominant association” for the eleven-billion-dollar college sports 
industry.4 It consists of 1066 colleges that participate in ninety-five 
athletic conferences.5 Although some accredited colleges are not 
NCAA members, “[f]or all practical purposes, the NCAA . . . directs 
and controls all major revenue-producing collegiate athletic events.”6 
In terms of its organizational structure, the NCAA is a bottom-up 
trade association.7 It operates pursuant to a more than four-hundred-
page manual that is voted upon by its membership (“NCAA 
Manual”).8 The NCAA Manual includes a formal constitution, 
numerous bylaws, and “literally thousands of rules.”9 Some of these 
rules grant the NCAA exclusive rights to use student-athletes’ names 
and likenesses to “promote NCAA championships or other NCAA 
events, activities or programs.”10 Meanwhile, other rules prevent 
 
4 Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 852 (N.D. Ind. 1990), aff’d, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th 
Cir. 1992); see also Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: 
Why the NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 61, 64 (2013) [hereinafter Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law]; Daniel A. 
Rascher & Andrew D. Schwarz, “Amateurism” in Big-Time College Sports, 14 
ANTITRUST 51, 52 (2000) (“The NCAA’s market share is most likely in the upper 90 
percent range for college athletics.”). 
5 See NCAA.ORG, http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa 
/membership+new (last visited Dec. 30, 2013) (listing the number of colleges that are 
NCAA members at 1066); cf. Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 
64–65 (estimating the NCAA’s total membership at “approximately twelve hundred”). 
6 Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 52 (quoting ARTHUR A. FLEISHER, BRIAN L. 
GOFF & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: A 
STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7 See generally Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motions to Dismiss, O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, Nos. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (accepting 
the plaintiffs’ description of the NCAA as a bottom-up trade association); see also Rohith 
A. Parasuraman, Note, Unionizing NCAA Division I Athletics: A Viable Solution?, 57 
DUKE L.J. 727, 727 n.1 (2007) (noting that as recently as November 2007, the NCAA 
described itself on its own website as a “bottom-up organization”). 
8 See NCAA, 2011-12 NCAA DIVISION 1 MANUAL (2011) [hereinafter NCAA 
MANUAL], available at https://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4224-2011-2012-ncaa           
-division-i-manual.aspx; Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 66. 
9 Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 
2647 (1996); see also Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 66 
(discussing generally the structure of the NCAA Manual). 
10 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 12.5.1.1.1. Students who wish to compete in an 
NCAA sport further must agree to adhere to granting such exclusive rights to the NCAA. 
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student-athletes from accepting remuneration, in any form, in 
connection with their athlete status.11 
B. College Sports Before the NCAA 
College sports did not always operate in today’s manner.12 In its 
early days, college sports operated outside the formal education 
process, and students raised the funds for sporting events 
themselves.13 During this era, students regulated their own athletic 
activities, and they determined which prospective athletes were 
eligible to compete.14 The proceeds derived from college sports, if 
any, stayed with the athletic teams. 
By the late 1800s, many colleges had begun to assume greater 
control over their sports teams.15 At the same time, these colleges 
joined together into athletic conferences.16 One of the earliest athletic 
conferences was the Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty 
Representatives, which was formed in 1895 by several Midwest 
colleges.17 In 1899, this conference expanded to nine teams and 
 
See generally Order Granting EA’s Motion to Dismiss and Denying CLC’s and NCAA’s 
Motions to Dismiss, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. 
C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL 1642256, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011) (discussing how the 
NCAA requires all student-athletes to sign Form 08-3a, designating away any rights to 
their own names and likenesses); see also Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Transfer, 
O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C 09-3329 CW, 2009 WL 4899217, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 11, 
2009) (further describing NCAA Form 08-3a). 
11 See, e.g., Marc Edelman, Closing the “Free Speech” Loophole: The Case for 
Protecting College Athletes’ Publicity Rights in Commercial Video Games, 65 FLA. L. 
REV. 553, 557 (2013) [hereinafter Edelman, Closing the “Free Speech” Loophole] (citing 
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 12.1.2). 
12 See infra notes 13–25 and accompanying text. 
13 Robert N. Davis, Academics and Athletics on a Collision Course, N.D. L. REV. 239, 
243 (1990). 
14 See generally Jim Peach, College Athletics, Universities, and the NCAA, 44 SOC. SCI. 
J. 11, 13 (2007) (explaining that “[p]rior to the organization of the NCAA, college athletes 
formed clubs and often performed all of the management functions of running a team 
themselves”). 
15 See Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Death Penalty: 
How Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 990 (1987) (providing 
examples of colleges beginning to take control over their athletic teams). 
16 See Smith, supra note 15, at 990; see also JOHN SAYLE WATTERSON, COLLEGE 
FOOTBALL: HISTORY SPECTACLE CONTROVERSY 2 (2000) (mentioning the passing of 
rules to regulate college football “at the conference and institutional level”). 
17 See Davis, supra note 13, at 244 (explaining that the initial meetings to form this 
conference were held in January 1895 in Chicago); Big Ten History, BIGTEN.ORG, 
http://www.bigten.org/trads/big10-trads.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014) (noting that these 
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adopted the moniker, the Big Nine Conference.18 In 1917, it added a 
tenth team and changed its moniker to the Big Ten.19 
The Big Ten Conference, from its inception, has been the most 
organized of the early college athletic conferences.20 Whereas many 
early athletic conferences ignored issues related to athlete eligibility, 
the Big Ten Conference has long enforced rules that limit eligibility 
to “full-time students who were not delinquent in their studies.”21 
Under the leadership of a conference commissioner, the Big Ten 
Conference has also historically prohibited its members from 
scheduling non-conference games against colleges that do not adhere 
to its strict academic requirements.22 
Nevertheless, none of the early athletic conferences—not even the 
Big Ten Conference—have historically enforced meaningful rules to 
limit on-field violence in college football. As a result, by the early 
twentieth century, investigative journalists had come to criticize 
college football for its high number of head and neck injuries.23 In 
November 1905, the Washington Post even detailed the fate of 
William Moore, a Union College football player who lost 
consciousness when he attempted “to get through the [New York 
 
seven colleges included the University of Chicago, University of Illinois, University of 
Michigan, University of Minnesota, Northwestern University, Purdue University, and 
University of Wisconsin); see generally WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 50 (noting that for 
a brief period of less than one year, this conference included Wake Forest University 
rather than the University of Michigan). 
18 See Big Ten History, supra note 17. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. (discussing the implementation of the Big Ten’s first eligibility rules). 
21 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion by Antitrust Plaintiffs for Summary Judgment at 15, In re Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. 4:09-cv 1967 CW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 
2013) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment for Antitrust Plaintiffs] 
(noting that “when college football was first developed, colleges and conferences adopted 
different definitions of amateurism”); Parasuraman, supra note 7, at 731 (referencing the 
concept of “home rule” where the home team made decisions about who was eligible to 
compete in a particular game). 
22 See Teddy Greenstein, With Changes on Way, Big Ten’s Delany Staying Put, CHI. 
TRIB. (July 1, 2008), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-07-01/sports/0806300782_1 
_tranghese-bcs-commissioner-jim-delany (discussing the creation of the Big Ten’s 
commissioner position in 1922); see also WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 183 (detailing the 
Big Ten Conference commissioner’s discussion of a potential “white list” of acceptable 
opponents and blacklisting unacceptable ones). 
23 See Marc Edelman & David Rosenthal, A Sobering Conflict: The Call for 
Consistency in the Message Colleges Send About Alcohol, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1389, 1398 (2010) (mentioning the disclosure of 149 serious injuries 
in football in 1905); see also infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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University football team’s center and] went at the line head first like a 
catapult.”24 Moore died six hours later.25 
C. Founding of the NCAA 
As journalists wrote with increasing ferocity about the dangers of 
college football, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt felt compelled to 
intervene.26 In 1905, President Roosevelt summoned the leaders of 
several well-known colleges to the White House to discuss ways to 
improve player safety.27 Shortly thereafter, New York University 
chancellor H.M. MacCracken held a separate meeting with college 
chancellors and presidents from throughout the country.28 At the 
meeting, MacCracken proposed “the reform . . . of intercollegiate 
athletics as a whole” through the auspices of a private national 
association.29 
From these meetings came the charter of the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association as a trade association designed to devise formal 
game rules, promote safety, and give college athletics some degree of 
public respectability.30 Although the NCAA’s founding members did 
not cede any independent authority to the NCAA, they empowered 
their new association to serve as “a declarant of ideals” and as a 
 
24 W. Burlette Carter, The Age of Innocence: The First 25 Years of the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association, 1906 to 1931, 8 VANDERBILT J. ENT. & TECH. L. 211, 215 
(2006) (citing Football Player Killed. William Moore, of Union College, Dies from Blow 
on Head., WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1905, in Sporting Section). 
25 Id. 
26 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
27 See Edelman & Rosenthal, supra note 23, at 1398 (discussing President Roosevelt’s 
intervention in the college football injury crisis); see also Carter, supra note 24, at 215 
(same). Some scholars believe that President Theodore Roosevelt was not entirely 
bothered by the physically dangerous nature of college football, but rather feared that, 
without change, the game would soon be abolished in its entirety. See, e.g., WATTERSON, 
supra note 16, at 64–65 (noting that President Roosevelt “believed strongly that football 
built character” and “believed just as strongly that roughness was necessary,” however, 
“he worried that brutality and lack of sportsmanship destroyed the good effects of 
football”). 
28 See Carter, supra note 24, at 217. 
29 Id. at 217–18 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
30 See Marc Edelman, Note, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men’s College 
Basketball, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861, 864 (2002) [hereinafter Edelman, Reevaluating 
Amateurism Standards] (noting that “[t]he NCAA was initially formed . . . for preventing 
student-athletes from on-the-field injuries”); see also Peach, supra note 14, at 13 
(mentioning the public respectability argument underlying the NCAA’s founding). 
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vehicle to make non-binding recommendations to its membership and 
the various athletic conferences.31 
D. College Sports Under the NCAA as a “Declarant of Ideals” 
In its incipience, the NCAA served in accordance with its charter 
as a “minor force” in the governance of college athletics.32 Its 
primary responsibilities included hosting championship events and 
providing a forum for colleges to discuss on-field safety issues.33 The 
NCAA’s most notable recommendations in its early years included 
adding the forward pass and the first down marker to college 
football—both innovations that were designed to open the playing 
field and reduce player injuries.34 
With the NCAA serving in this limited capacity, collegiate 
athletics thrived in the first half of the twentieth century.35 As fan 
interest skyrocketed, colleges from around the country built large 
national stadiums to meet the needs of their growing fan base.36 The 
popularity of college football grew most rapidly in the Midwest, 
where the Big Ten colleges emerged as the on-field elite.37 In 1922, 
 
31 Carter, supra note 24, at 220, 227; see also Kevin Sherrington, Rising Up Against the 
‘Sanity Code,’ DALL. MORNING NEWS, Aug. 18, 2013, 2013 WLNR 26652352 (noting 
that until 1948, “[t]he NCAA had no enforcement powers”); Parasuraman, supra note 7, at 
731 (explaining that even after the creation of the NCAA, college sports maintained its 
system of “home rule” where individual colleges determined player eligibility for given 
contests). 
32 Smith, supra note 15, at 991. 
33 See id.; see also Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards, supra note 30, at 
866 (explaining that “through the 1920s collegiate sports regulation remained primarily a 
function of student-athletes and faculty, with the NCAA playing a minor role in 
developing on-the-field rules and organizing championship events”). 
34 See WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 101–02. 
35 See, e.g., RAYMOND SCHMIDT, SHAPING COLLEGE FOOTBALL: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AN AMERICAN SPORT 1919–1930, at 1, 4, 7 (2007) (describing the 
1920s as the “glory era” of college football). 
36 See Gary Andrew Poole, Classic Stadiums, Classic Memories, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 
2005, at F1 (noting that “[w]ith professional football just a bunch of ragtag company-
sponsored teams in the 1920’s, the university squads could barely keep up with their 
growing fan base,” and that “[t]o satisfy the demand, colleges scrambled to erect stadiums 
that could hold tens of thousands of people, especially in the Midwest”). 
37 See id. (discussing how the growth of college football and erecting of large football 
stadiums occurred most rapidly in the Midwest); see also College Football National 
Championships in NCAA Division I FBS, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki 
/College_football_national_championships_in_NCAA_Division_I_FBS (last visited Feb. 
22, 2014) (showing that between 1918 and 1933, a Big Ten Conference football team was 
selected as the national champion on thirteen occasions by one or more of the college 
football selection committees). 
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the Big Ten’s Ohio State University opened a 66,210-seat stadium in 
the heart of its Columbus campus—a stadium that was more than 
quadruple the size of its old home field.38 Although Ohio State 
initially struggled to fill this stadium, it ultimately sold out all 66,210 
seats for a late 1922 game against the University of Michigan, and it 
thereafter began to sell out games with regularity.39 In fact, Ohio 
Stadium became so popular among Big Ten football fans that just five 
years later the University of Michigan decided to build an even bigger 
stadium that held 72,000 fans, which Michigan fans thereafter 
nicknamed the “Big House.”40 
As college sports enjoyed a growing national audience, student-
athletes began to gain celebrity status.41 In football, University of 
Illinois running back Red Grange emerged in the late 1920s as the 
most famous of all college athletes after he scored six touchdowns in 
a single game against the University of Michigan.42 Nicknamed “the 
 
38 See Jim Naveau, Ohio Stadium–90 Years Tradition, Memories, O-H-I-O, TROY 
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 30, 2012, at B4 (describing the first season at Ohio Stadium, including 
the stadium’s inaugural game between Ohio State University and Ohio Wesleyan). 
39 See id. (noting that seventy thousand fans packed into the stadium in 1922 to watch 
Ohio State University play the University of Michigan, even though the stadium only had 
seats for 66,210). 
40 See Michigan Stadium Top 10 Facts, MICH. ATHLETICS, http://www.mgoblue.com 
/genrel/070109aaa.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (estimating the original capacity of 
Michigan Stadium at 72,000); see also The Big House is Getting Bigger, N.Y. TIMES, June 
22, 2007, at D6 (noting that the cost to build the Big House in 1927 was $950,000). 
41 See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (discussing celebrity status of Red 
Grange). In addition to Red Grange, another one of the earliest college football players to 
gain national celebrity status was Jim Thorpe, a Native American who excelled at football, 
baseball, and Olympics competition. See Thorpe, James Francis (1888–1953), OKLA. 
HISTORICAL SOC’Y, http://digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/T/TH016.html 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2014). In addition, the “Four Horsemen” of Notre Dame collectively 
gained great fame during a period of Notre Dame’s offensive dominance from 1922 
through 1924. See The Four Horsemen, U. NOTRE DAME ATHLETICS, http://www.und 
.com/trads/horse.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
42 See Poole, supra note 36 (“On the day in 1924 when Memorial Stadium at the 
University of Illinois was dedicated, Red Grange ran for five touchdowns and threw for a 
sixth against Michigan. Football historians still consider the first 12 minutes of that game, 
in which Grange ran for 265 yards and 4 of the touchdowns, college football’s greatest 
individual performance.”); see also Gerald Eskenazi, Red Grange, Football Hero of 
1920’s, Dead at 87, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/29 
/obituaries/red-grange-football-hero-of-1920-s-dead-at-87.html (“The Grange legend 
flowered one afternoon in 1924, when his Illinois team was facing undefeated Michigan. 
That day was also dedication day for Illinois Memorial Stadium, and 66,609 fans turned 
out for the game. While many people were still finding their seats, Mr. Grange took the 
opening kickoff 95 yards for a touchdown. Then, on the Illini’s first play from scrimmage, 
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Galloping Ghost,” Grange enjoyed as much fame as any U.S. 
celebrity of his time, other than perhaps Charles Lindbergh or Babe 
Ruth.43 By his final year in college, Grange had hired an agent to help 
him negotiate career opportunities in business and in Hollywood.44 
Ultimately, Grange accepted a job with the National Football 
League’s Chicago Bears, a decision that helped to popularize 
professional football throughout the United States.45 
E. Transformation of the NCAA 
Yet, despite the overwhelming popularity of college sports from 
1905 through the 1930s, members of the Big Ten Conference were 
ready to tear everything apart.46 By the end of World War II, 
members of this powerful athletic conference had come to believe that 
there was a second crisis emerging in college sports: one that 
involved southern colleges paying “scholarships” to their student-
athletes as a way to recruit premier talent.47 Members of the Big Ten 
Conference argued for the need to impose strict national rules to 
prevent southern colleges from continuing to pay their athletes.48 
In truth, the Big Ten’s allegations of a national crisis were likely 
overstated; the only clear effect of colleges paying “scholarships” was 
 
he broke through for a 67-yard touchdown. He followed that with touchdown runs of 54 
yards and then 44 yards. He astounded everyone present, as well as the larger football 
world, by rushing for 265 yards and 4 touchdowns in the first 12 minutes of the game. . . . 
Soon after, he returned and scored his fifth touchdown of the day, on a 13-yard run. For 
good measure, he tossed a 20-yard scoring pass in the fourth quarter as Illinois won, 39-
14. In 41 minutes of play, he was responsible for 402 yards of offense, including 64 yards 
as a passer.”). 
43 See Eskenazi, supra note 42 (mentioning Grange’s nickname of “Galloping Ghost” 
and recounting a story of Babe Ruth inviting himself to Grange’s hotel room to give him 
two items of advice about fame: “don’t believe anything they write about you, and don’t 
pick up too many dinner checks”). 
44 WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 153 (explaining that Grange was “the first big-time 
celebrity [college] football player”); Marc Edelman, Disarming the Trojan Horse of the 
UAAA and SPARTA: How America Should Reform its Sports Agent Laws to Conform with 
True Agency Principles, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 145, 149–50 (2013) (explaining 
that Red Grange’s fame as a college running back was so great that he became among the 
first athletes to hire a player agent to represent his interests). 
45 See Eskenazi, supra note 42 (mentioning Grange’s later induction into the 
Professional Football Hall of Fame in 1963). 
46 See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text (discussing overwhelming popularity 
of college football from 1905 through the 1930s); see infra notes 48–51 and accompanying 
text (discussing Big Ten Conference’s efforts to change the status quo by implementing 
strong, centralized control of college football via the NCAA). 
47 WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 183. 
48 See id. at 183–98. 
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that it shifted on-field dominance in college football away from the 
Big Ten and toward the Southeastern Conference.49 Nevertheless, Big 
Ten members sought the support of other traditionally strong football 
schools to prevent the power dynamic from shifting.50 Thus, the Big 
Ten Conference worked to transform the NCAA from a “declarant of 
ideals” into an association with direct authority to punish colleges that 
did not adhere to its vision of “amateurism.”51 
Based on the Big Ten Conference’s lobbying efforts, the NCAA in 
1948 adopted a “Sanity Code” that empowered the association to ban 
any member school that compensated a student-athlete with more 
than just the cost of tuition.52 The Sanity Code “stipulated that 
institutions could provide tuition and fees for student athletes but 
nothing more.”53 Thus, “[i]f athletes wanted something to eat or a 
place to sleep, they had to pay for it themselves or work for it.”54 
After some southern colleges threatened to leave the NCAA in 
objection to the Sanity Code, the Big Ten Conference members 
developed an alternative scheme that replaced the Sanity Code with a 
complex national regulatory structure for college sports.55 The Big 
Ten Conference leaders then successfully nominated one of their own 
assistants, Walter Byers, to assume the new role as NCAA Executive 
Director and implement this structure.56 
 
49 See generally College Football National Championships in NCAA Division I FBS, 
supra note 37 (noting that between 1940 and 1953, the University of Tennessee was 
selected as national champion by at least one selection committee on three occasions, and 
the University of Alabama, University of Georgia, and Georgia Tech University were each 
selected as national champion by at least one selection committee on two occasions). 
50 See WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 184 (discussing a letter written by Big Ten 
Conference commissioner John Griffiths to Amos Alonzo Stagg of California, requesting 
his support in a national effort to take steps to prevent Southeastern Conference colleges 
from providing financial benefits to student-athletes). 
51 Carter, supra note 24, at 220, 227. 
52 See Sherrington, supra note 31; see also Parasuraman, supra note 7, at 731 
(explaining further that the “Sanity Code” consisted of five principles, ranging from 
financial aid, recruitment, athletic standards for athletes, institutional control, and the 
principle of amateurism itself). 
53 Sherrington, supra note 31. 
54 Id. 
55 See WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 236 (discussing the creation of the modern 
NCAA). 
56 See id. (discussing the appointment of Walter Byers); see also Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., 
The Lawsuit and the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013 
/06/22/opinion/nocera-the-lawsuit-and-the-ncaa.html?_r=0 (explaining how Byers took 
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Byers turned to the sale of television broadcast rights for NCAA 
sporting events as a way to increase revenues to implement the 
complex regulatory structure.57 By selling national television rights to 
a college football game of the week, Byers generated more than $1 
million in revenue during the first year alone.58 This revenue provided 
the NCAA with the funds it needed to launch a new investigative 
arm.59 But the selling of television rights also opened up a Pandora’s 
Box.60 Before long, the NCAA was commercializing most aspects of 
college sports, including the sale of rights to use student-athletes’ 
names and likenesses.61 
F. College Athletics Under the Modern, Commercial NCAA 
The NCAA’s paradoxical goal of maximizing revenues in college 
sports while at the same time preventing student-athletes from 
participating in commercial ventures has served as a core part of its 
mission for at least the past half century.62 Although the NCAA has 
insisted that it is a nonprofit association that cares deeply about 
curbing commercialism, the NCAA admitted to Congress in 2006 that 
its operating revenues for all divisions of college sports totaled 
approximately $7.8 billion.63 Since then, the NCAA’s aggregate 
 
over an NCAA that was “toothless and penniless” and was asked initially to operate the 
NCAA out of the back of the Big Ten Conference offices). 
57 See generally WATTERSON, supra note 16, at 249 (noting that “the NCAA decided to 
adopt a [televised] game-of-the-week policy” in 1951). 
58 See WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE 
ATHLETES 79 (1995) (explaining that in 1952 the NCAA sold NBC rights to a dozen 
“Game of the Week” shows for a total rights fee of $1,144,000); see also Edelman & 
Rosenthal, supra note 23, at 1401 (noting that Walter Byers signed this television contract 
“[w]ithin months of his initial appointment”). 
59 Cf. BYERS, supra note 58, at 90 (explaining that among the NCAA’s expenditures 
that followed the signing of its first television contract was the 1952 establishment of a 
26,900 square-foot NCAA headquarters office in Kansas City, Missouri, at a cost of $1.5 
million). 
60 See infra notes 63–72 and accompanying text (discussing many of the subsequent 
ways that the NCAA and its members thereafter commercialized college sports). 
61 See, e.g., Peach, supra note 14, at 14 (describing as “controversial” the NCAA’s 
more recent attempts to ensure that none of the revenue from college athletics flows to the 
student-athletes). 
62 See generally infra notes 63–72 and accompanying text. 
63 Letter from Myles Brand, President, NCAA, to Hon. William Thomas, Chairman, 
House Comm. on Ways and Means (Nov. 13, 2006), at 16, available at http://www.nacua 
.org/documents/NCAALetter_TaxExempt_ResponsetoHouseWaysMeansCmte.pdf. 
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revenues have only continued to increase.64 Today, the total value of 
the college sports enterprise is estimated at more than $11 billion.65 
In recent years, the broadcasting and licensing arms of college 
sports have grown most rapidly, transforming Division I college 
athletics into something akin to a professional sports league.66 There 
are now at least fifty NCAA Division I colleges that produce annual 
revenues in excess of $50 million, and at least five NCAA Division I 
colleges that produce annual revenues that exceed $100 million.67 
Among these high revenue-producing schools, the University of 
Alabama reported revenues of $143.4 million for the 2012–13 
academic year—an amount greater than the annual revenues of 25 
NBA teams and all 30 NHL teams.68 
These revenues, in turn, are passed along in the form of higher 
salaries and other fringe benefits for NCAA officers, college 
presidents, athletic directors, and coaches.69 During the 2011 calendar 
year, NCAA Commissioner Mark Emmert received $1.7 million in 
salary for his role in overseeing the NCAA, and NCAA Chief 
Operating Officer Jim Isch received $977,531.70 Meanwhile, salaries 
of the forty-four head football coaches at NCAA Bowl Championship 
 
64 See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
65 See Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 63. 
66 See generally Jeff Ostrowski, For UF Athletic Programs, Blue + Orange = Green, 
PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 16, 2007, at 1A (quoting former University of Michigan 
President James Duderstadt who expressed concern that the NCAA spends more time 
“negotiating broadcasting contracts or licensing agreements than on cost containment, 
much less concern about the welfare of student-athletes or the proper role of college sports 
in a university”); see also infra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
67 College Athletics Revenues and Expenses–2008, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/ncaa 
/revenue (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
68 See Brian Leigh, Alabama Athletics Report $143.4 Million in Revenue for the 2012-
13 Year, BLEACHER REP. (Oct. 22, 2013), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1821041         
-alabama-athletics-report-1434-million-in-revenue-for-2012-13-year (providing details of 
University Alabama athletic revenues for 2012-13); see also NBA Team Values: The 
Business of Basketball, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/nba-valuations (last visited Feb. 
22, 2014); NHL Team Values: The Business of Hockey, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com 
/nhl-valuations/list (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
69 See infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text; see also Edelman, Reevaluating 
Amateurism Standards, supra note 30, at 864 (discussing how the NCAA maintains the 
wealth of college sports “in the hands of a select few administrators, athletic directors, and 
coaches”). 
70 Steve Berkowitz, Emmert Made $1.7 Million, According to NCAA Tax Return, USA 
TODAY (July 14, 2013, 1:16 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/07 
/10/ncaa-mark-emmert-salary-million-tax-return/2505667. 
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Series colleges have skyrocketed from $273,300 in 1986 to 
$2,054,700 today.71 In forty of the fifty U.S. states, the highest paid 
public official is currently the head coach of a state university’s 
football or men’s basketball team.72 
Nevertheless, current NCAA rules continue to require member 
colleges to control the commercial rights to student-athlete identities, 
as well as to prevent member colleges from sharing licensing 
revenues with their student-athletes.73 Thus, at a time when the 
NCAA executives, college presidents, athletic directors, and coaches 
have all become exceedingly wealthy, many student-athletes remain 
poor.74 A 2011 report entitled The Price of Poverty in Big Time 
College Sports notes that more than eighty-five percent of college 
athletes on scholarships continue to live below the poverty line.75 
II 
THE NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETE NAME & LIKENESS LICENSING 
LITIGATION 
A. Prologue 
As differences in the standard of living between NCAA Division I 
employees and their student-athletes have increased, so too has the 
legal friction between the two groups.76 Although traditional 
deterrents to student-athletes suing the NCAA have included the fear 
of negative backlash from their coaches and the media, this fear has 
 
71 Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment for Antitrust Plaintiffs, supra note 
21, at 14 (citing to the case’s record at 108–09). 
72 Josephine (Jo) R. Potuto, William H. Lyons & Kevin N. Rask, What’s in a Name? 
The Collegiate Mark, the Collegiate Model, and the Treatment of Student-Athletes, 92 OR. 
L. REV. 879, 893. 
73 See Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 68–69. 
74 See Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism, supra note 30, at 876 (recounting former 
University of Michigan basketball star Chris Webber discussing that, despite the 
University of Michigan’s huge profits from his basketball success, he “could not [even] 
afford to buy fast-food dinner”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also infra 
note 75 and accompanying text. 
75 See Edelman, Closing the “Free Speech” Loophole, supra note 11, at 581. 
76 See, e.g., Tom Dowd, Inequities on the Way to Catching Up with College Sports, 
STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE (Aug. 18, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.silive.com/sports 
/advance/dowd/index.ssf/2013/08/inequities_on_the_way_to_catch.html (noting the 
growing “backlash” among student-athletes toward their coaches and others in the college 
sports system that are making millions of dollars but ignoring the economic realities faced 
by student-athletes). 
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vanquished with greater public understanding about the inequity in 
college sports.77 
By the early 2000s, it seemed inevitable that a student-athlete 
would seek redress from the courts if the NCAA did not reform its 
own policies.78 Yet the NCAA stubbornly maintained its status quo. 
Thus, a legal battle ensued.79 
B. Procedural History 
On June 21, 2009, twelve former NCAA football and men’s 
basketball players, led by former UCLA basketball standout Ed 
O’Bannon, filed an antitrust complaint against the NCAA in the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California.80 The complaint 
alleged, in pertinent part, that NCAA members violated Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act by “conspir[ing] to fix the prices they received for 
the ‘use and sale of [former student athletes’] images, likenesses 
and/or names at zero dollars’” and by “engag[ing] in a group boycott / 
refusal to deal conspiracy.”81 The complaint further alleged that these 
restraints occurred within a product market for live broadcasts, 
various kinds of non-live game video footage, and college sports 
videogames.82 
 
77 Cf. Andy Staples, Current College Athletes Added to O’Bannon Suit Against NCAA, 
SI.COM (July 18, 2013, 9:52 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/college-football/news 
/20130718/obannon-lawsuit-college-players-ncaa (explaining that plaintiffs’ lawyers were 
concerned about their ability to find a current Division I college athlete based on the fear 
of backlash; however, that proved not to be a problem). 
78 See NAT’L COLLEGE PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.ncpanow.org/about (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2014) (stating that the National College Players Association has sought various 
means to change the status quo in college sports since holding its first press conference in 
January 2011). 
79 See infra notes 80–95 and accompanying text. 
80 See O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 1; see also Order Granting EA’s Motion to 
Dismiss and Denying CLC’s and NCAA’s Motions to Dismiss, supra note 10, at *1 
(stating that the plaintiffs included “eight former college basketball players and four 
former college football players”); Order Denying Motions to Dismiss at *1, In re Student-
Athlete Name & Likenesses Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 
2013) (explaining that all the plaintiffs in the case played their sport “between 1953 and 
the present”). 
81 Order Granting EA’s Motion to Dismiss and Denying CLC’s and NCAA’s Motions 
to Dismiss, supra note 10, at *2; see also NCAA’s Memorandum in Support of Summary 
Judgment Motion, supra note 1, at *3 (discussing the three types of uses of former college 
athlete likenesses under challenge). 
82 See O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 1. 
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Since filing their antitrust complaint, the plaintiffs’ case has 
morphed “like Heraclitus’s river: always changing, yet always the 
same.”83 On January 15, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California consolidated the O’Bannon litigation 
with a similar case before that same court, Keller v. Electronic Arts.84 
The Keller litigation had asserted claims against the NCAA, the 
College Licensing Company (the NCAA’s independent licensing 
arm), and the videogame developer Electronic Arts, all related to an 
alleged conspiracy to violate student-athletes’ publicity rights in 
college sports videogames.85 The central link between the two cases 
was one of Electronic Arts’s affirmative defenses in Keller: that the 
NCAA granted it the rights to use student-athlete likenesses.86 
Meanwhile, in the early stages of O’Bannon, the NCAA denied 
having granted any such rights to third parties.87 
After the court consolidated O’Bannon and Keller into a single 
litigation (i.e., NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litigation), the plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint and moved 
for class certification—a motion that the NCAA vehemently 
 
83 See Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Baltimore Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d 
410, 413 (7th Cir. 1994) (“A professional sports team is like Heraclitus’s river: always 
changing, yet always the same.”). 
84 See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part EA’s Motion to Stay (Docket No. 
156), Denying CLC’s and NCAA’s Motions to Stay (Docket Nos. 163 and 166) at *1, and 
Denying Without Prejudice Publicity Rights Plaintiffs’ Motion to Deconsolidate (Docket 
No. 236), In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, No. C 09-
1967 CW, 2010 WL 5644656 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010). 
85 See id. For a further discussion of student-athletes’ publicity rights and their potential 
violation by Electronic Arts videogames, see, e.g., Edelman, Closing the “Free Speech” 
Loophole, supra note 11, at 559 (providing a comprehensive analysis on this topic). 
86 See Electronic Arts Inc.’s Answer to Antitrust Allegations in Second Consolidated 
Amended Class Action Complaint at *63, In re Student-Athlete Names & Likeness Litig., 
No. C 09-01967 CW, 2011 WL 3565064 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2011) (noting as Electronic 
Arts’s fourteenth affirmative defense that “[p]laintiffs’ claims are barred, in whole or in 
part, by the doctrine of license, because some Antitrust Plaintiffs and putative class 
members have licensed the right to use their Names, Images, and/or Likenesses”). 
87 See generally Jon Solomon, NCAA Knew EA Sports Videogames Used Real Players, 
E-Mails from Ed O’Bannon Lawsuit Show, AL.COM (Nov. 12, 2012, 8:18 PM), 
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2012/11/ncaa_knew_ea_sports_video_game.html 
(quoting NCAA spokesperson Erik Christianson as continuing to take the position that 
“the NCAA never marketed student-athlete likeness[es]”). The credibility of such a claim, 
however, was suspect from the very beginning. See, e.g., id. (describing emails from the 
NCAA that are contrary to what the NCAA has claimed); Potuto et al., supra note 72, at 
958 (“[T]he NCAA cannot credibly claim that it had no knowledge that EA Sports used 
avatars and a computer application. In fact, in 2004, Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) 
advised the NCAA to permit greater verisimilitude in the games to protect sales 
revenue.”). 
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opposed.88 Thereafter, the court notified the plaintiffs that they would 
need to add at least one current student-athlete to their complaint, 
which led the plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint adding six 
current student-athletes as named plaintiffs.89 
Nevertheless, before the court could review this third amended 
complaint, the plaintiffs entered into settlement negotiations with both 
Electronic Arts and the College Licensing Company, which led to the 
filing of a stipulation of settlement.90 This left the court to review the 
merits of the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims only vis-à-vis the NCAA.91 
Once again, the plaintiffs’ claims survived a motion to dismiss.92 
Most recently, on November 8, 2013, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California certified a class to pursue 
 
88 See Order Denying Motions to Dismiss, supra note 80, at *3 (“In September 2012, 
Plaintiffs moved to certify a class to pursue their antitrust claims.”); id. at *5–6 (explaining 
that the NCAA moved in October 2012 to strike plaintiffs’ class certification motion, and 
that the court denied the motion but granted the NCAA additional time to file 
supplemental briefs; based on this grant of additional time, the court did not hear oral 
arguments on the class certification motion until June of 2013). See also Tom Fornelli, 
Court Asks O’Bannon’s Lawyers to Add Current Players to Lawsuit, CBSSPORTS.COM 
(June 21, 2013, 2:29 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-
football /22498428/obannons-lawyers-asked-to-add-current-players-to-lawsuit (noting that 
“[t]he NCAA maintains the lawsuit should not be a class-action lawsuit because the claims 
of thousands of college athletes are different and should not be treated the same”); cf. 
Stewart Mandel, Some Movement, But No Ruling in Ed O’Bannon v. NCAA Hearing, 
SI.COM (June 20, 2013, 10:17 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/college-football/news 
/20130620/ruling-obannon-ncaa-case/ (noting that on June 20, 2013, “after months of 
cumbersome motions and rebuttals, attorneys for all parties finally stood before Judge 
Claudia Wilken and argued why she should or shouldn’t grant the plaintiffs’ motion to 
certify a class of several thousand current and former college athletes”). 
89 See Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 1, In re Student-Athlete 
Name & Likenesses Licensing Litig., No. C 09-01967 CW, 2013 WL 3810438 (N.D. Cal., 
July 19, 2013); see also Steve Berkowitz, Judge Will Allow Current Player to Join 
O’Bannon Suit, USA TODAY (July 5, 2013, 6:24 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story 
/sports/college/2013/07/05/ed-obannon-ncaa-likeness-lawsuit/2492981 (discussing the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California’s July 5, 2013 ruling to allow the 
plaintiffs in O’Bannon “to amend their complaint against the NCAA . . . and to add a new 
named plaintiff who is a current college athlete”); Fornelli, supra note 88. 
90 See Order Denying Motions to Dismiss, supra note 80, at *1, *7; see also Nicole 
Auerbach, NCAA’s Emmert Not Talking Settlement in O’Bannon Lawsuit, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 11, 2013 (noting that final settlement is still pending before the courts); cf. Potuto et 
al., supra note 72, at 911 (explaining that “[t]he settlement was no surprise, given that EA 
Sports’ claim that its videogames were entitled to First Amendment protection was 
rejected by two federal circuit courts”). 
91 See Order Denying Motions to Dismiss, supra note 80. 
92 See id. 
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injunctive relief against the NCAA.93 The certified class includes the 
following: 
All current and former student-athletes residing in the United States who 
compete on, or competed on, an NCAA Division I . . . college or university 
men’s basketball team or on an NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision . . . men’s 
football team and whose images, likenesses, and/or names may be, or have been, 
included in game footage or videogames licensed or sold by [the NCAA], their 
co-conspirators, or their licensees after the conclusion of the athlete’s 
participation in intercollegiate athletics.94 
The court did not certify a damages subclass.95 However, former 
student-athletes who seek to recover money from the NCAA may still 
attempt to do so through separate litigation. 
C. Perfunctory Analysis of the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litigation 
While it is too soon to predict the outcome of the NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, the plaintiffs’ antitrust 
arguments enjoy strong legal and factual support.96 Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, in pertinent part, states that “[e]very contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . 
is declared to be illegal.”97 This Act “reflects a legislative judgment 
that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but 
also better goods and services.”98 
Traditionally, courts have interpreted Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, in conjunction with preexisting common law, to prohibit any 
 
93 See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Class Certification at *3–
7, C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5979327 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013). 
94 Id. at *5. 
95 Id. at *6, *17 (explaining that the certification of a damages subclass failed under 
Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the plaintiffs “failed to satisfy the 
manageability requirement because they have not identified a feasible way to determine 
which members of the Damages Subclass were actually harmed by the NCAA’s allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct”). 
96 See generally NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984) (“By participating 
in an association which prevents member institutions from competing against each other    
. . . the NCAA member institutions have created a horizontal restraint—an agreement 
among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another. A restraint of 
this type has often been held to be unreasonable as a matter of law.”). 
97 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); see generally Edelman, Amateurism and 
Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 70 (explaining that the NCAA’s bar on compensation of 
student-athletes “can reasonably be interpreted as the very antithesis to the type of 
competitive markets envisioned by drafters of the Sherman Act”). 
98 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). 
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restraints deemed to be “unreasonable.”99 To ascertain whether a 
restraint is unreasonable, courts apply a three-part test.100 First, courts 
will assess whether the restraint involves concerted action between 
two legally distinct entities that affects trade or commerce among 
several states (“Threshold Requirements”).101 Then, courts must 
determine whether the alleged restraint impermissibly suppresses 
competition within any relevant market (“Competitive Effects 
Test”).102 Finally, courts must decide whether “any antitrust 
exemption or affirmative defense[] negate[s] the finding of [antitrust] 
liability.”103 
When applying this three-part test based on publicly available 
information, it seems feasible that the NCAA’s restraints against 
student-athletes’ commercial control of their identities violate Section 
1 of the Sherman Act.104 First, in terms of the Threshold 
Requirements, it has been widely held that rules implemented by the 
NCAA represent concerted activity because the NCAA is a bottom-up 
trade association with its rulemaking powers delegated to its 
membership.105 Similarly, most courts have held that NCAA rules 
 
99 See, e.g., Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98 (noting that “the Sherman Act [is] 
intended to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade”). 
100 See Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really any Different from 
Illegal Group Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally 
Restrains Trade, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 640 (2009) [hereinafter Edelman, 
Commissioner Suspensions]. 
101 Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. NBC, 219 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir. 2000); see also 
Edelman, Commissioner Suspensions, supra note 100, at 640–41. 
102 Edelman, Commissioner Suspensions, supra note 100, at 640. 
103 See id. at 641. 
104 See infra notes 105–19 and accompanying text. 
105 See, e.g., Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding “the showing 
of an agreement or contract is . . . not at issue” because “[t]here is no question that all 
NCAA member schools have agreed to abide by the [NCAA] Bylaws”); Hairston v. Pac. 
10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996) (similarly finding that an agreement 
among all of the colleges in the Pac-10 conference fulfills the concerted activity prong); 
Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at *4 (finding that the 
plaintiffs in O’Bannon “adequately plead[ed] facts to satisfy the first prong of [the] 
Sherman Act claims” by alleging that the NCAA represents itself as a bottom-up 
organization, ruled by its membership). But see Pennsylvania v. NCAA, 948 F. Supp. 2d 
416, 424 (M.D. Penn. 2013) (rejecting what the court describes as a “conclusory 
allegation” that the NCAA’s actions, in themselves, constitute concerted activity). 
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affect interstate commerce based on their impact on the nationwide 
broadcasting and licensing markets.106 
Second, with respect to the Competitive Effects Test, the legal 
issues are even more fact intensive.107 A plaintiff challenging the 
NCAA’s control over student-athletes’ names and likenesses would 
need to show that the NCAA exercises market power in some relevant 
market involving student-athlete names and likenesses and that the 
anti-competitive effects in this market outweigh any pro-competitive 
benefits in the same market.108 
With respect to the market power aspect of the Competitive Effects 
Test, there are subtle differences among the circuits in defining the 
relevant market.109 However, most courts have long accepted that “[a] 
relevant market ‘encompasses notions of geography as well as 
product use, quality, and description.’”110 Applying this view, “[t]he 
geographic market [definition] extends to the area of effective 
competition . . . where buyers can turn for alternative sources of 
supply” and “[t]he product market [definition] includes the pool of 
goods or services that enjoy reasonable interchangeability of use and 
cross-elasticity of demand.”111 In the context of collegiate sports, 
 
106 See, e.g., Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at *5 
(noting that the District Court for the Northern District of California found that the 
plaintiffs in O’Bannon had met their requirement with respect to pleading an impact on 
interstate commerce by alleging that “the anti-competitive effects of which he complains 
occur in the nation-wide collegiate licensing market”). But see Edelman, Amateurism and 
Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 83 (“[E]ight lower courts within the First, Third, and Sixth 
Circuits have contrarily held that the NCAA’s ‘eligibility’ rules are exempt from antitrust 
scrutiny because these rules do not affect ‘trade or commerce’ and thus fail to meet one of 
the threshold requirements for antitrust scrutiny. These decisions, however, rely on 
inaccurate factual presumptions about the NCAA and outdated interpretations of antitrust 
law that have since been rejected by the Supreme Court. Thus, although these decisions 
survive as a deviant strain of precedent within three federal circuits, they cannot survive 
the Supreme Court’s current antitrust jurisprudence.”). 
107 See infra notes 108–13 and accompanying text. 
108 See Marc Edelman, Upon Further Review: Will the NFL’s Trademark Licensing 
Practices Survive Full Antitrust Scrutiny? The Remand of American Needle v. Nat’l 
Football League, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 201 (2011); see also Copperweld Corp. 
v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (describing the Rule of Reason as 
“an inquiry into market power and market structure”). 
109 See generally Marc Edelman, Does the NBA Still Have “Market Power?” Exploring 
the Antitrust Implications of an Increasingly Global Market for Men’s Basketball Player 
Labor, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 549, 582–85 (2010) (discussing some of the different ways, and 
the challenges, of defining relevant markets in labor antitrust claims such as those 
involving athletic labor). 
110 Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motions to Dismiss, supra note 7, at *4 (quoting 
Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
111 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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there are thus several plausible antitrust markets in which the NCAA 
at least arguably exercises market power.112 Among them, the NCAA 
at least arguably exercises market power within a national market for 
the “rights to use the images of athletes connected with collegiate 
sports.”113  
Finally, the third step of the analysis—that of determining whether 
any antitrust exemption or affirmative defense negates the finding of 
antitrust liability—requires a balancing of the economic effects within 
such market. The academic literature on this issue widely recognizes 
that the NCAA’s practices yield at least some bona fide anti-
competitive effect.114 As University of Indiana Sports Law professor 
Gary Roberts astutely pointed out in his 1996 Tulane Law Review 
article, “rules restricting the compensation student-athletes can be 
given by their universities for athletic services [are generally seen as] 
a blatant price (wage) fix.”115 Thus, unless the NCAA can prove an 
economically recognizable pro-competitive benefit of its restraints on 
student-athlete compensation, it “has no reasonable defense for its 
otherwise collusive wage fixing.”116 
The NCAA’s pleadings in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litigation nevertheless indicate that the NCAA 
believes there are at least two broad categories of affirmative defenses 
that support its restraints on student-athletes’ commercial rights to 
their own likenesses.117 First, the NCAA believes that its rules 
precluding student-athletes from controlling the commercial rights to 
their likenesses are pro-competitive because they preserve 
 
112 See generally Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motions to Dismiss, supra note 7, at *4 
(quoting Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solutions, 513 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 
2008), for the proposition that “the validity of the ‘relevant market’ is typically a factual 
element rather than a legal element”). 
113 Id. at *5; see generally Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 52 (explaining that 
“[t]he relevant geographic market [in antitrust lawsuits against the NCAA] is generally 
accepted to be the United States”). Without conducting a full factual discovery on this 
matter, plaintiffs theoretically might be able to support the finding of such a market based 
on the Collegiate Licensing Company’s statement that it manages “more than 75%” of this 
purported market. Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motions to Dismiss, supra note 7, at *5 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
114 See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
115 Roberts, supra note 9, at 2649. 
116 Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 51. 
117 See infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
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competitive balance in college sports competitions.118 In addition, the 
NCAA alleges that, even absent competitive balance concerns, 
controlling the commercial rights to student-athletes’ names and 
likenesses is necessary to maintain the financial viability of college 
sports.119 These arguments are explored further in the next two 
sections of this article. 
III 
AN ANALYSIS OF NCAA COMMERCIAL RESTRAINTS AND 
COMPETITIVE BALANCE 
A. The NCAA’s Argument that Revenue Sharing Would Destroy 
Competitive Balance 
The NCAA has long argued that “amateurism is a sine qua non of 
college sports” and its rules that forbid members from sharing 
revenues with student-athletes are both pro-competitive and necessary 
for the maintenance of college athletics because they “preserve 
amateurism and thereby maintain competitive balance.”120 Without 
these rules, the NCAA argues, prospective student-athletes would 
flock to high-revenue producing schools, and competitive balance in 
college sports would be destroyed.121 
Courts are currently in flux as to whether competitive balance even 
constitutes a legally cognizable affirmative defense under antitrust 
law.122 On the one hand, past decisions such as Smith v. Pro Football, 
Inc. and Mackey v. NFL have held that closer game scores alone can 
 
118 See Order Denying Motions to Compel Production of Documents by Nonparties at 
*2, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., Nos. 09-cv-01967-CW (NC), 
11-mc-80300 CW (NC), 12-mc-80020 CW (NC), 2012 WL 629225 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(noting that “[i]n support of one of its affirmative defenses, the NCAA’s claims that the 
NCAA rules . . . promote amateurism and competitive balance between and among NCAA 
member institutions”); Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 51 (discussing the 
longstanding nature of this argument by the NCAA). As a matter of law, there remains 
some question as to whether competitive balance is truly a pro-competitive benefit that 
courts may consider. See Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 96. 
119 See Defendant NCAA’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Third Consolidated 
Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 3, at 2 (purporting that the NCAA rules that 
preclude student-athlete compensation “allow its survival in the face of commercializing 
pressures”). 
120 Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 51. 
121 See NCAA’s Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 1, 
at *17 (stating that “it is basic economics that providing substantial and widely varying 
payments to prospective recruits would create strong incentives for recruits to move to 
high revenue schools”). 
122 Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 96. 
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never offset an otherwise anti-competitive labor restraint.123 
However, on the other hand, dictum in the Supreme Court’s recent 
American Needle, Inc. v. NFL decision, as well as other recent lower 
court decisions, leaves open the possibility that competitive balance 
might be deemed pro-competitive under certain circumstances.124 
Nevertheless, it is unnecessary to delve into a nuanced discussion 
about when, if at all, competitive balance legitimizes a sports league’s 
labor restraints.125 Even if one were to presume that competitive 
balance is always a bona fide defense to labor market restraints in 
organized sports, the NCAA’s competitive balance argument still fails 
for four separate reasons: (1) the college sports industry already lacks 
year-to-year competitive balance; (2) the college sports industry also 
lacks seasonal competitive balance; (3) lack of competitive balance 
does not translate into poor attendance; and (4) there are less 
restrictive ways to maintain competitive balance.126  
B. The College Sports Industry Already Lacks Year-to-Year 
Competitive Balance 
First, the NCAA’s competitive balance defense may be called into 
doubt by strong evidence that there has never been competitive 
balance in college sports on a year-to-year basis.127 According to a 
thorough study performed by New Mexico State University 
economics professor Jim Peach, the historic distribution of the top 
eight rankings among Division I college football teams indicates a 
very high concentration among winners in Division I sports 
 
123 Id.; see also Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(finding the NFL draft’s alleged pro-competitive effect based on increased on-field 
competitive balance to be “nil”); Mackey v. NFL, 542 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(finding that the possibility of a decline in quality of play based on alleged loss of 
competitive balance does not justify the NFL’s current restraints on the free market for 
NFL player labor). 
124 Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 96; see also American 
Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010) (noting that “the interest in maintaining 
competitive balance among athletic teams is legitimate and important” (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 
820, 833 (3rd Cir. 2010) (analyzing competitive balance concerns in the context of an 
antitrust analysis involving competitive tennis contest). 
125 See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
126 See discussion infra Parts III.B–E. 
127 See infra notes 128–39 and accompanying text. 
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contests.128 For example, between 1950 and 2005, just five college 
football teams have accounted for a quarter of all top eight finishers, 
and just twenty-two teams have accounted for three-quarters of all top 
eight finishers.129 The University of Oklahoma has finished in the top 
eight on twenty-nine separate occasions.130 Meanwhile, numerous 
Division I college football teams have not even finished in the top 
eight once.131 
The same general findings about lack of competitive balance also 
extend to men’s college basketball.132 Between 1950 and 2005, just 
four men’s Division I college basketball teams represented nearly a 
quarter of all Final Four appearances, and thirteen colleges 
represented half of all appearances.133 Both the University of North 
Carolina and the University of California-Los Angeles have made the 
Final Four on fifteen occasions.134 Duke University has made it 
fourteen times.135 Meanwhile, many other NCAA Division I colleges 
have not appeared in even a single Final Four. 
There has also been a lack of competitive balance over time in both 
low-revenue producing sports and in women’s sports.136 Since the 
NCAA first began to sponsor men’s volleyball championships in 
1970, just two schools—UCLA and Pepperdine—have been to the 
championship game thirty-four times, and just six schools combine to 
account for more than eighty percent of all possible championship 
appearances.137 Similarly, in women’s college basketball, just two 
schools—the University of Tennessee and Louisiana Tech 
University—account for twenty-seven percent of all Final Four 
appearances, and just six schools account for more than half of all 
Final Four appearances.138 The University of Tennessee women’s 
basketball team has appeared in the Final Four on sixteen of twenty-
four occasions; meanwhile, many Division I women’s college 
basketball teams have not appeared in a single Final Four.139 
 
128 Peach, supra note 14. 
129 Id. at 16 tbl.1. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 See infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text. 
133 Peach, supra note 14, at 17. 
134 Id. at 17 tbl.3. 
135 Id. 
136 See id. at 15. 
137 See id. at 18 tbl.6. 
138 See id. at 19 tbl.7. 
139 See id. 
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C. The College Sports Industry Also Already Lacks Seasonal 
Competitive Balance 
The NCAA’s competitive balance defense also must fail because 
there is little competitive balance within many individual college 
games.140 For example, during college football’s 2013 season, there 
were sixteen different games in which a Top Twenty-Five ranked 
team defeated its scheduled opponent by forty-five or more points.141 
Those blowouts included three games played on September 21, 2013, 
with the following scores: Ohio State University 76, Florida A&M 0; 
Louisville University 72, Florida International University 0; and the 
University of Miami 77, Savannah State College 7.142 
NCAA Division I men’s basketball likewise has featured many 
contests that lack any semblance of competitive balance.143 In 
November 2013, there were six NCAA Division I men’s basketball 
games in which a Top Twenty-Five ranked team defeated its 
opponent by more than forty-five points.144 Those games included the 
University of Iowa’s 103-41 annihilation of Abilene Christian, Iowa 
State University’s 110-51 victory over University of Missouri-Kansas 
City, and Oklahoma State University’s 117-62 win over Mississippi 
Valley State University.145 Even in the annual NCAA men’s 
basketball tournament, which has become one of the most popular 
college sporting events of the year, there are regularly first-round 
games between No. 1 and No. 16 seeded teams with final scores 
separated by more than thirty points.146 
 
140 See infra notes 141–46 and accompanying text. 
141 See FBS College Football Scores, CBSSPORTS.COM, http://www.cbssports.com 
/collegefootball/scoreboard /top25/2013/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
142 See id. (clicking on link to week 4 will display relevant scores). 
143 See infra notes 144–46 and accompanying text. 
144 See Div. I: Men’s Basketball Scoreboard, NCAA.COM, http://www.ncaa.com 
/scoreboards/basketball-men/d1 (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
145 Jason Brummond, Iowa Routs Abilene Christian 103-41, NCAA.COM, http://www 
.ncaa.com/game/basketball-men/d1/2013/11/17/abilene-christian-iowa (last visited Feb. 
23, 2014); Luke Meredith, No. 17 Iowa State Thumps UMKC 110-51, NCAA.COM, 
http://www.ncaa.com/game/basketball-men/d1/2013/11/25/umkc-iowa-st (last visited Dec. 
30, 2013); Nash, Forte Help No. 8 Oklahoma St Top MVSU 117-62, NCAA.COM, 
http://www.ncaa.com/game/basketball-men/d1/2013/11/08/mississippi-val-oklahoma-st 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
146 See March Madness Betting: Tournament Seed Trends, SBR FORUM (Feb. 17, 2011, 
12:00 AM), http://www.sbrforum.com/ncaa-basketball/news/march-madness-betting         
-tournament-seed-trends-a-18372/ (noting that from 2000 to 2010, the average point 
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D. Lack of Competitive Balance Does Not Translate into Poor 
Attendance 
The third reason why the NCAA’s competitive balance defense 
must fail is because those games most lacking in competitive balance 
have not harmed college sports’ revenue stream.147 To the contrary, 
many of the more attended college football games during the 2013 
season were games in which fans should have reasonably expected 
one team to defeat the other by a large point margin.148 For instance, 
there were 103,595 fans in attendance at Ohio Stadium on September 
21, 2013, when Ohio State University annihilated Florida A&M 76-
0.149 Similarly, there were 81,411 fans in attendance at University of 
South Carolina’s Williams-Brice Stadium on November 23, 2013, 
when the University of South Carolina defeated Coastal Carolina 70-
10.150 While the strong fan turnout at both of these games cannot 
preclude the possibility that competitive balance is one factor in 
determining fan attendance, it fully rebuts the argument that 
competitive balance is the determinant factor. 
Equally as revealing, a few of the top-ranked college football teams 
in 2013 actually had better home attendance for blowout wins against 
unranked opponents than for close wins against highly-ranked 
opponents.151 For example, the University of Oklahoma football team 
had 84,776 home fans in attendance for its 48-10 blowout win over 
Iowa State University, but just 84,734 fans in attendance for its 
narrow 38-30 home win over comparably ranked Texas Tech 
University.152 Similarly, the UCLA football team had higher home 
attendance for its 37-10 home victory against the unranked University 
of California-Berkeley than for its 38-33 loss to a comparably ranked 
 
differential in NCAA men’s basketball games between No. 1 and No. 16 seeds was 26.4 
points). 
147 See infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
148 See NCAA College Football Scoreboard, ESPN.COM, http://espn.com/college-
football/scoreboard (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
149 See Box Score: Florida A&M vs. Ohio State, ESPN.COM (Sept. 21, 2013, 12:00 
PM), http://espn.com/ncf/boxscore?gameId=332640194. 
150 See Nov. 23, 2013 Box Score: Coastal Carolina Chanticleers vs. South Carolina 
Gamecocks, ESPN.COM, http://espn.com/ncf/boxscore?gameId=333272579 (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2013). 
151 See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
152 See Box Score: Iowa State vs. Oklahoma, ESPN.COM (Nov. 16, 2013, 12:00 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/ncf/boxscore?gameId=333200201; see also Box Score: Texas Tech vs. 
Oklahoma, ESPN.COM (Oct. 26, 2013, 4:45 PM), http://espn.go.com/ncf/boxscore?gameId 
=332990201. 
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opponent, Arizona State University.153 Although idiosyncrasies in 
ticket resale markets could have played some role in fan preferences, 
these findings on their face seem to indicate that fans of both the 
University of Oklahoma and the University of California-Los Angeles 
might actually prefer games with less competitive balance, and thus 
the higher likelihood of a home team victory. 
E. There Are Less Restrictive Ways of Maintaining Competitive 
Balance 
Finally, the NCAA’s competitive balance defense must fail 
because even if it were true that college sports currently maintain 
some competitive balance (which is doubtful for the reasons 
discussed above) and that the loss of competitive balance would lead 
to a loss of revenues (again, doubtful for the reasons discussed 
above), the NCAA still could implement competitive balance in 
numerous other ways that would be less restrictive on the financial 
rights of student-athletes.154 One alternative would be to allow 
student-athletes to form a national association to collectively bargain 
against the NCAA in a manner similar to how professional athletes 
currently bargain with their sports leagues.155 Collective bargaining 
might lead to an arrangement under which competitive balance is 
maintained through negotiated compensation floors and caps, as well 
as some revenue sharing among college athletic departments.156 If 
 
153 See Box Score: California vs. UCLA, ESPN.COM (Oct. 12, 2013, 10:30 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/ncf/boxscore?gameId=332850026 (listing spectator attendance at 
84,272); Box Score: Arizona State vs. UCLA, ESPN.COM (Nov. 23, 2013, 7:00 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/ncf/boxscore?gameId=333270026 (listing spectator attendance at 
70,131). 
154 See Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 96 (noting that “short 
of imposing a national, industry-wide bar on student-athlete compensation” there are 
“other, less restrictive ways that colleges can level the sports playing field”); see also infra 
notes 157–62 and accompanying text. 
155 See generally Parasuraman, supra note 7, at 727 (discussing the possibility of 
student-athletes unionizing). 
156 See generally Alan M. Levine, Note, Hard Cap or Soft Cap: The Optimal Player 
Mobility Restrictions for the Professional Sports Leagues, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 243 (1995) (discussing how professional sports leagues, through 
collective bargaining, have adopted salary caps, salary floors, luxury taxes, and a host of 
other mechanisms to maintain certain levels of competitive balance in their leagues); Marc 
Edelman, Why the “Single Entity” Defense Can Never Apply to the NFL Clubs: A Primer 
on Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 891, 905–06, 911–24 (2008) (discussing professional sports leagues’ use of 
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organized properly, this alternative would be entirely exempt from 
antitrust scrutiny based on antitrust law’s non-statutory labor 
exemption.157 
Another alternative would be “to devolve power from the NCAA 
to the various collegiate conferences.”158 As economists Daniel A. 
Rascher and Andrew D. Schwarz explained in a 2000 article 
published by Antitrust Magazine, this result would allow each 
conference to “choose a common wage regime, and within [each] 
conference, the necessary balance for the creation of a team sport 
would be maintained, without the need for an overarching supercartel 
[sic] to control the entire market for college-age athletes.”159 
Imposing these restraints on the conference level, rather than the 
national level, makes economic sense for two reasons: (1) no single 
individual athletic conference is likely to exercise market power,160 
and (2) many athletic conferences already have a program for revenue 
sharing among members.161 Furthermore, because most college 
 
various revenue sharing arrangements to smooth differences in revenues between the 
independent professional sports teams). 
157 See generally Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and “Free Movement” Risks 
of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
403, 415–16 (2009) (“The non-statutory labor exemption is a court-created exemption, 
resulting from judicial decisions to give aspects of collective bargaining agreements 
further immunity from antitrust law. [This] exemption has an important place in sports law 
because players’ associations (unions) collectively bargain with teams (employers) to form 
a league’s collective bargaining agreement.”); Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker, 
Collectively Bargained Age/Education Requirements: A Source of Antitrust Risk for Sports 
Club-Owners or Labor Risk for Players Unions?, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 341, 366 (2010) 
(explaining that a majority of the circuits have found the non-statutory labor exemption to 
insulate from antitrust liability any restraint that involves mandatory subjects of 
bargaining, which primarily affects the parties involved, and that is reached through bona 
fide, arm’s-length bargaining; other circuits, such as the Second, apply this exemption 
even more broadly). 
158 See Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 54; see also Edelman, Amateurism and 
Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 96 (suggesting that “colleges could just as easily implement 
salary caps at the conference level rather than at the league level”). 
159 See Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 54. 
160 See Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 97 (explaining that 
unlike the NCAA, which is a national trade association, individual member conferences 
are not likely to be large enough to exercise power over student-athlete labor within any 
relevant market); see generally Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 
2001) (finding the market for college athletes’ labor to be “national in scope”); cf. Hairston 
v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319–20 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the 
enforcement of a rule created at the conference level that prevents colleges from paying 
their athletes was permissible under the rule of reason). 
161 See, e.g., Big Ten History, BIGTEN.ORG, http://www.bigten.org/trads/big10-trads 
.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2014) (“In 1955, the Big Ten formulated a revenue-sharing 
model designed to pool all football television rights of its members and share those 
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sporting events are already played by teams from within a single 
athletic conference, a conference-wide wage regime would help to 
equalize game scores without having such a ubiquitous anti-
competitive effect on student-athletes’ commercial rights to their own 
identities.162 
IV 
AN ANALYSIS OF NCAA COMMERCIAL RESTRAINTS AND THE 
FINANCIAL VIABILITY OF COLLEGE SPORTS 
A. Three Additional NCAA Arguments About Why Revenue Sharing 
Would Destroy the Financial Viability of College Sports 
In addition to the NCAA’s competitive balance defense of its 
commercial restraints on student-athletes, the NCAA further argues 
that the financial viability of college sports overall would be 
destroyed if it were not able to control the commercial rights to 
student-athlete names and likenesses.163 This argument arises from a 
number of different NCAA theories of financial ruin.164 
Among those theories, the NCAA’s most common argument is that 
its restraints on student-athletes’ identities are needed to make 
“NCAA sports more popular, increasing output, consumer demand 
and consumer value.”165 The NCAA supports this claim through a 
self-commissioned survey that purports fans would be less likely “to 
watch, listen to, or attend games” if football or men’s basketball 
players were paid.166 It also relies upon the declarations of University 
of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman and University of 
Wisconsin-Madison Chancellor Rebecca Blank, who claim that 
 
proceeds equally. The conference and its members continue to utilize a revenue-sharing 
model, dividing media rights, bowl payouts and other profits among all conference 
institutions.”). 
162 Edelman, Amateurism and Antitrust Law, supra note 4, at 96–97 (discussing this 
same argument in the broader context on salary/wage restraints). 
163 See infra notes 165–71 and accompanying text. 
164 See id. 
165 NCAA’s Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 1, at 
*12. 
166 Id. at *12–13 (citing the “Dennis survey” commissioned by an NCAA purported 
expert, which alleges that 68.9% of respondents were opposed to revenue sharing with 
student-athletes, and that a minority of respondents would be “less likely to watch, listen 
to, or attend games if football or men’s basketball players were paid”). 
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compensated student-athletes would undermine the popularity of 
college sports.167 
Another variation of this financial viability argument theorizes that 
allowing NCAA members to share revenues with student-athletes 
would create legal obstacles under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, which in turn could destroy the financial 
backbone of the NCAA and its member colleges.168 This argument 
seems to assume that if NCAA members were allowed to share 
revenues with student-athletes, they might do so in a manner that 
violates Title IX, thus resulting in a barrage of lawsuits against 
member colleges that would destroy the colleges’ bottom lines.169 
Meanwhile, yet a third variant of the NCAA’s financial viability 
argument is that, if not for its commercial restraints on student-
athletes, the NCAA members would enter into bidding wars to 
provide the best revenue sharing structure for student-athletes, which, 
when coupled with NCAA members’ other financial commitments, 
would lead to the financial demise of college sports.170 This argument 
 
167 See NCAA’s Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 1, 
at *14 (quoting testimony from University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman that 
“amateurism is fundamental to Michigan athletics” and that paying student-athletes 
“would undermine the popularity of Michigan football and men’s basketball,” and 
testimony from University of Wisconsin-Madison Chancellor Rebecca Blank stating that 
“the popularity of college sports would be impacted negatively if football and men’s 
basketball players were paid for participating . . . in televised games” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citations omitted)). 
168 See, e.g., Nicole Auerbach & Steve Berkowitz, Big Ten’s Delany Sees No Settlement 
in O’Bannon Case, USA TODAY (Oct. 31, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://www.usatoday.com 
/story/sports/ncaab/bigten/2013/10/31/jim-delany-big-ten-ed-obannon-lawsuit-no-settle 
ment/3329665/ (quoting Big Ten Conference commissioner Jim Delany proclaiming that 
“[i]f the plaintiffs were to win [the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litigation], 
then Congress has to figure out what they’ll do with Title IX and the schools have to figure 
out how they react and respond”); see also Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (1994). 
169 See David Wharton, It’s Judgment Day for NCAA: Athletes’ Antitrust Lawsuit 
Seeking Revenue Sharing at Crucial Juncture, CHI. TRIB., June 20, 2013, § 3A, at 7, 
available at http://ireader.olivesoftware.com/Olive/iReader/chicagotribune/SharedArticle 
.ashx?document=CTC%5C2013%5C06%5C20&article=Ar07502 (noting that critics 
allege that revenue sharing in college sports “might preclude athletic departments from 
maintaining women’s teams in compliance with Title IX”); see also Auerbach & 
Berkowitz, supra note 168. 
170 See Potuto et al., supra note 72, at 918 (stating that if student-athletes were 
compensated, “the world of intercollegiate athletics might morph into something much 
like minor league baseball or arena football. In turn, there is risk that intercollegiate 
athletics will lose its viability and attraction to fans. Were that to happen, collegiate 
athletic revenues would then begin to dry up—even in football and men’s basketball—to 
the ultimate detriment of college athletics and all student-athletes.”). 
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is similar to the failed arguments in defense of professional sports 
leagues’ labor restraints that were argued in federal court during the 
late 1960s and 1970s.171 
B. College Sports Fans Do Not Truly Care if the Athletes Are Unpaid 
Nevertheless, none of the NCAA’s arguments of financial doom 
can be supported by any meaningful facts.172 The NCAA’s argument 
that consumers are only interested in college sports because student-
athletes are unpaid is dubious.173 Other than the NCAA’s recent self-
serving study, there has never been any empirical evidence that 
indicates fan devotion to college sports emerges from the NCAA’s 
100:0 revenue split with its student-athletes.174 To the contrary, even 
at times when it has been widely reported that student-athletes have 
received some pay, fan attendance at college sporting events featuring 
these athletes has remained strong.175 For example, the average 
attendance at Southern Methodist University college football games 
rose between 1985 and 1986, even as the NCAA was publicly 
investigating the college for allowing impermissible stipends to 
student-athletes.176 
 
171 See generally Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding 
that the NFL’s amateur draft violated antitrust law); Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 
F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding NFL restraint on player movement could not be saved by 
NFL’s purported financial rationales). 
172 See infra notes 174–81 and accompanying text. 
173 See NCAA’s Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 1, 
at *12. 
174 See Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 54 (describing that whether consumers 
truly prefer unpaid student-athletes is “an open question”); infra note 175 and 
accompanying text. 
175 See Conference Attendance by School, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. J., 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2012/01/02/Research-and-Ratings 
/Attendence.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2014) (noting that Ohio State University averaged 
105,231 fans per game in home attendance for the 2011 college football season, down just 
forty-seven fans per game from the previous season, even though numerous Ohio State 
University football players were investigated during the summer of 2011 for having 
purportedly received improper benefits in violation of the NCAA rules); see generally 
Adam Rittenberg, Terrelle Pryor Facing Significant Inquiry, ESPN.COM (June 1, 2011, 
11:11 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=6608432 (noting that Ohio State 
University quarterback Terrelle Pryor and “four other players have been suspended for the 
first five games [of the Ohio State 2011 season] for accepting improper benefits from a 
local tattoo-shop owner”). 
176 See e-mail from Alan Cannon, Texas A&M University Athletic Department (Aug. 
15, 2013, 11:13 AM) (on file with author). 
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Additionally, the recent testimony by University of Michigan 
President Mary Sue Coleman and University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Chancellor Rebecca Blank in favor of preventing revenue sharing 
with student-athletes is fraught with self-interest. Both Coleman and 
Blank are employees of Big Ten Conference colleges—the very same 
colleges that sought to impose the NCAA’s current restraints on 
student-athletes beginning with their lobbying on behalf of the Sanity 
Code in the late 1940s. In addition, if a share of the University of 
Michigan and University of Wisconsin-Madison athletic revenues 
were reallocated to student-athletes, there would be a smaller fund of 
money to compensate either Coleman or Blank, thus providing a 
direct financial incentive for each to oppose granting NCAA members 
the option of sharing revenues with student-athletes. 
Furthermore, to the contrary of the NCAA’s purported evidence of 
fan demand for college sports featuring only unpaid athletes, actual 
past behaviors of college sports fans indicate that many fans might 
actually prefer college sports if the athletes were paid.177 For 
example, the college booster clubs are some of “the biggest 
supporters of college sports,” and yet they “are also the ones who are 
often caught professionalizing the sport by paying their alma mater’s 
athletes under the table.”178 In addition, the NCAA has not hesitated 
to give fans the impression that student-athletes are professionals by 
scheduling important games during class days and displaying their 
images throughout campuses and the Internet as part of their own 
marketing efforts.179 
 
177 See infra notes 178–79 and accompanying text. 
178 Rascher & Schwarz, supra note 4, at 54. 
179 See, e.g., Laura Pappano, How Big-Time Sports Ate College Life, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
22, 2012 (Education Life), at 23, 25 (discussing how “[c]lasses are canceled [at Ohio State 
University] to accommodate [sports] broadcast schedules” and “[e]ven Boston College 
bowed, canceling afternoon classes because the football game against Florida State was on 
ESPN at 8 p.m.”); Joe Nocera, Op-Ed, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 30, 2011, § MM, at 30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine 
/lets-start-paying-college-athletes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (explaining that college 
athletes “look around and see jerseys with their names on them being sold in the 
bookstores” and due to the time commitment involved in playing their sport “learn early 
on not to take any course that might require real effort or interfere with the primary reason 
they are on campus”); Sean Gregory, It’s Time to Pay College Athletes, TIME MAG. (Sept. 
16, 2013), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2151167,00.html (noting 
that “[t]he athlete is the most available publicity material [a] college has” and that “[a] 
great scientific discovery will make good press material for a few days, but nothing to 
compare to that of the performance of a first-class athlete”); cf. Matthew J. Mitten et al., 
Targeted Reform of Commercialized Intercollegiate Athletics, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 
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Finally, if it were true that fan interest in college athletics would 
decline if student-athletes were compensated, there would be no need 
for the NCAA to impose an association-wide rule to prevent member 
colleges from reaching other arrangements with their student-athletes. 
Indeed, if college athletics truly would be more popular if no student-
athletes received compensation, no NCAA member college would 
ever make the decision to compensate student-athletes even if the 
NCAA allowed it. 
C. Sharing Revenues with Student-Athletes Will Not Place NCAA 
Members at High Risk of Title IX Lawsuits, Nor Does the NCAA Truly 
Even Care Much About Gender Pay Equality 
It is similarly doubtful that either the NCAA or its member 
colleges would face liability under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 for sharing licensing revenues for the use of 
student-athletes’ names and likenesses, even if a greater aggregate 
amount in revenues are shared with male student-athletes.180 
Although this would be a legal issue of first impression, Title IX’s 
requirements prohibiting gender-based pay discrimination are 
generally interpreted as coextensive with the antidiscrimination 
provisions that appear in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.181 Thus, disparate compensation of male and 
female student-athletes would be permissible under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 as long as the male student-athletes’ 
job descriptions involved greater skill, effort, and responsibility than 
the female student-athletes’ job descriptions.182 
 
792 (2010) (detailing at length how “academic leaders increasingly use intercollegiate 
sports as a catalyst and means” to achieve various economic goals). 
180 See infra notes 181–88 and accompanying text. 
181 See John Gaal et al., Gender-Based Pay Disparities in Intercollegiate Coaching: 
The Legal Issues, 28 J.C. & U.L. 519, 545–46 (2002) (explaining that “the few courts that 
have addressed Title IX as an independent employment discrimination statute in the 
context of coaches’ compensation have not viewed it as any broader than the EPA or Title 
VII”); see also Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that the plaintiff’s Title IX claim fails for the same reasons her Equal Pay Act 
claim fails). 
182 See Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1074 (“To make out a prima facie case [under the Equal 
Pay Act,] the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the jobs being compared are 
‘substantially equal.’”); see also Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) 
(“No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall 
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between 
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate 
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There is a strong argument that male student-athletes’ jobs indeed 
involve greater skill, effort, and responsibility for purposes of pay 
discrimination laws because male student-athletes in football and 
men’s basketball typically generate substantially higher revenues for 
their colleges from the use of their names and likenesses than do 
female student-athletes.183 The case that seems to best support such a 
view is Stanley v. University of Southern California.184 There, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a motion to 
enjoin the University of Southern California from paying more to its 
men’s basketball coach than to its women’s basketball coach, citing 
that the revenue generated by the men’s coach is “90 times greater 
than the revenue generated by the women’s basketball team.”185 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the NCAA’s alleged concerns 
about the gender pay gap seem disingenuous in light of various 
NCAA members’ longstanding practice of allowing for a wide pay 
gap between male and female coaches, even in sports where 
differences in revenue generation would not justify such a 
distinction.186 A 2001 Chronicle of Higher Education survey on the 
gender pay gap in college sports found that the disparity in pay among 
college athletic coaches was far greater than the disparity in society 
 
at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal 
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and 
which are performed under similar working conditions . . . .”). 
183 See Gaal et al., supra note 181, at 527 (“Courts have recognized that differences in 
revenue production and media expectations can provide evidence of a difference in 
responsibilities sufficient to preclude a finding of ‘equal work’”); see also Stanley v. Univ. 
of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1322 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The responsibility to produce a large 
amount of revenue is evidence of a substantial difference in responsibility.”); Jacobs v. 
Coll. of William & Mary, 517 F. Supp. 791, 797 (E.D. Va. 1980), aff’d without opinion, 
661 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that the obligation to produce revenue demonstrates 
that coaching jobs are not substantially equal). 
184 13 F.3d 1313. 
185 Id. at 1321 (rejecting a request by the former head coach of the University of 
Southern California women’s basketball team for a preliminary injunction enjoining the 
university from offering a lower wage to its women’s basketball coach). Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that nearly five years later, upon motion for summary judgment, the 
same court avoided addressing the issue of whether substantial differences in revenue 
generation necessarily make jobs dissimilar, finding that the University of Southern 
California had separately proven that the pay differential between its men’s and women’s 
coaches was due to bona fide difference in the levels of experience and qualifications 
between the coaches. See Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1074–75. 
186 See Gaal et. al., supra note 181, at 520 (quoting a thirty-two percent disparity in 
salary levels for softball and baseball coaches, and a fifty-four percent disparity in salary 
levels for men’s and women’s ice hockey coaches). 
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overall.187 Meanwhile, statistics accumulated by the Department of 
Education from 2003 to 2010 show that the average salary for NCAA 
Division I men’s team coaches increased sixty-seven percent, whereas 
the salary for women’s team coaches increased just sixteen 
percent.188 In the context of the gender disparity of college coaches’ 
pay, the NCAA has remained largely silent. 
D. There Are Enough Revenues to Go Around for College Athletics to 
Operate Profitably Even After Sharing Revenues with Student-
Athletes 
Finally, despite the NCAA’s assertions to the contrary, it is indeed 
possible for the NCAA and its member schools to operate at a profit 
even after compensating student-athletes for the use of their 
likenesses.189 What would be required, however, would be for the 
NCAA to operate as a leaner, more efficient trade organization, and 
for NCAA member colleges to begin paying their presidents, athletic 
directors, and coaches at salary rates that are more reflective of the 
free market.190 
Much like many other monopolist trade associations, the NCAA 
currently operates inefficiently.191 Since the early 1950s, the NCAA 
has maintained a complex operating manual, which today 
 
187 See id. (citing Jennifer Jacobson, Female Coaches Lag in Pay and Opportunities to 
Oversee Men’s Teams, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 8, 2001, at A39). 
188 See James K. Gentry & Raquel Meyer Alexander, Pay for Women’s Coaches Lags 
that for Men’s Coaches, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2012, at B10, available at http://www.ny 
times.com/2012/04/03/sports/ncaabasketball/pay-for-womens-basketball-coaches-lags-far 
-behind-mens-coaches.html?pagewanted=all (further noting that “[f]or Division I 
basketball, the median salary for coaches of a men’s team in 2010 was $329,300, nearly 
twice that of coaches for women’s teams, who had a median of $171,600. Over the past 
four years, the median pay of men’s head coaches increased 40 percent compared with 28 
percent for women’s coaches.”). 
189 See infra notes 190–98 and accompanying text. 
190 See Patrick Hruby, The Free Market Case Against the NCAA Chokehold on College 
Sports, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar 
/30/the-free-market-case-against-the-ncaa-chokehold-on/?page=all (providing a 
journalist’s perspective on the above-market contracts awarded to college coaches and 
administrators due to market inefficiencies); Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism 
Standards, supra note 30, at 864 (same, from a law and economics perspective). 
191 See generally Hruby, supra note 190 (discussing various areas of “inefficiency” 
created by the NCAA cartel arrangement, including the overpaying of coaches and athletic 
department employees and expenditures on weight rooms and other facilities that the 
author deems meaningless and unnecessary to the typical consumer). 
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astoundingly includes “literally thousands of rules.”192 In addition, 
the NCAA maintains a bloated staff of employees to handle all of the 
enforcement, infractions, and student-athlete reinstatement cases that 
arise from its complex set of rules.193 The NCAA also maintains an 
Eligibility Center, which certifies eligibility for domestic and 
international prospective student-athletes based on both academic and 
amateurism requirements.194 
Of course, none of these services are necessary, as they are merely 
creations of the association’s own internal bureaucracy. Indeed, 
college sports operated efficiently and enjoyably in the United States 
from the late 1800s until the early 1950s without such operating 
expenses.195 For example, at the time of Red Grange, the NCAA 
maintained very few rules and it did not have a single employee—not 
even an association president.196 Nevertheless, fans packed into 
college football stadiums to watch their teams play.197 There was just 
as much fan interest in the games, and perhaps there was even more 
passion about the final results.198 
CONCLUSION 
It is not surprising that the NCAA goes to great lengths to construct 
a myth about how sharing revenues with student-athletes would 
“destroy college sports.”199 The NCAA’s current licensing 
arrangement is simply too profitable for college administrators, 
athletic directors and coaches to willingly forgo. 
Nevertheless, the NCAA’s arguments for prohibiting revenue 
sharing with student-athletes are not based on bona fide economic 
benefits to society. The NCAA’s competitive balance argument 
ignores that Division I college sports already lack substantial 
 
192 Roberts, supra note 9, at 2647. 
193 See generally Potuto et al., supra note 72, at 889-905 (discussing all the functions 
that the modern NCAA provides). 
194 Id. at 915 (citing NCAA MANUAL, supra note 8, § 4.01.2.2). 
195 See supra notes 13–45 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra notes 35–45 and accompanying text. 
197 See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text. 
198 See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text. 
199 See Munson, supra note 3 (quoting the NCAA chief legal officer Donald Remy 
stating that the plaintiffs suing the NCAA in the O’Bannon case seek “to destroy college 
sports for the vast majority of student-athletes in order to pay a few”); see also Defendant 
NCAA’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Third Consolidated Class Action 
Complaint, supra note 3, at 2 (purporting that the NCAA rules that preclude student-
athlete compensation “allow its survival in the face of commercializing pressures”). 
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competitive balance, and that this lack of competitive balance has not 
translated into meaningful loss of consumer interest. In addition, the 
NCAA’s competitive balance argument overlooks that there are less 
restrictive ways to maintain competitive balance in college sports 
without depriving student-athletes of free market opportunities to sell 
the rights to their names and likenesses. 
Likewise, the NCAA’s argument that sharing revenues with 
student-athletes would lead to the financial demise of college sports is 
farfetched. There is little, if any, evidence that consumers would stop 
attending college sporting events if some revenues were shifted to 
student-athletes. Similarly, there is little, if any, evidence that sharing 
licensing revenues with student-athletes would create a bona fide 
issue under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 or 
otherwise exacerbate gender inequity in college sports. 
Lastly, a plaintiffs’ win in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litigation would not truly deprive NCAA 
members of the economic means to host athletic events in a wide 
range of sports or to pay their essential employees reasonable salaries. 
Rather, a win for the plaintiffs would simply require NCAA members 
to make more efficient business decisions about what ventures to 
enter and what levels of compensation to pay to their employees. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is extraordinarily unlikely that a 
win for the plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athletes Name & Likeness 
Litigation would have the deleterious effects on college sports that the 
NCAA and its members so capriciously proclaim. If anything, a win 
for the plaintiffs would only improve the college sports marketplace 
by better allocating student-athlete labor with consumer demand for 
their services. In addition, a win for the plaintiffs would force NCAA 
member colleges to make more efficient business decisions, and 
would preclude the NCAA from operating as a cartel that hoards its 




200 Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards, supra note 30, at 864 (explaining 
that today’s NCAA operates like a “commercial cartel” that “maximizes profits beyond a 
competitive rate and maintains wealth in the hands of a select few administrators, athletic 
directors, and coaches”). 
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